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Abstract
According to the Asymmetry, we’ve strong moral reason to prevent
miserable lives from coming into existence, but no moral reason to
bring happy lives into existence. This procreative asymmetry is often
thought to be part of commonsense morality, however theoretically
puzzling it might prove to be. I argue that this is a mistake. The
asymmetry is merely prima facie intuitive, and loses its appeal on
further reflection. Mature commonsense morality recognizes no fun-
damental procreative asymmetry. It may recognize some superficially
similar theses, but we will see that they derive from more familiar
principles, and are compatible with there being moral reason to bring
happy lives into existence.
Introduction
We’ve moral reason to prevent miserable lives from coming into existence, but
no (intrinsic) moral reason to bring happy lives into existence. So claims the
Asymmetry. It is theoretically puzzling—McMahan (2009, 67), for example,
∗Thanks to Greg Currie, Johan Gustafsson, Stephen Holland, Christian Piller, Peter
Singer, Catherine Wilson, Helen Yetter-Chappell, an anonymous referee, and the partic-
ipants in the ‘New Work in Population Ethics’ panel of the 2015 MANCEPT workshop,
for helpful comments and discussion.
Richard Yetter Chappell — Rethinking the Asymmetry 2 of 17
concludes that “the prospects for finding a compelling theoretical defense of
the Asymmetry are not promising.” Nonetheless, it is widely regarded as
capturing commonsense intuitions (McMahan 2009; Roberts 2011). I argue
that this is a mistake. The Asymmetry is not merely false, but unsupported ;
it is thought to be “intuitive” primarily because it has been implicitly con-
fused with other, more plausible theses. We can very happily do without it.
(Of course, I do not deny that some philosophers may continue to find the
Asymmetry intuitive. Idiosyncratic intuitions are always possible. What I
deny is that the Asymmetry can muster the kind of widespread intuitive sup-
port needed to qualify it as a commitment of “commonsense morality”. Many
who find it prima facie plausible will cease to find it so upon considering the
distinctions drawn in this paper. That, at least, is my ambition.)
Commonsense morality may, for example, hold that it is generally worse
to cause harm (or a bad state) than it is to fail to benefit (or bring about
a good state). We might then derive from this the Weak Asymmetry that
we’ve more reason to prevent bad lives than to create good ones (McMahan
2009, 57). I’m happy to grant that weaker thesis here. It is compatible with
our having moral reason to bring good lives into existence.
The first part of this paper will make the case for thinking that there
is no fundamental procreative asymmetry. In particular, the Asymmetry is
not supported by our intuitions about cases. There is an intuitive deontic
asymmetry, but it is not a fundamental one, as it can be seen to instead
derive from a contingent asymmetry in demandingness. So, while typical
cases might appear to support a deontic asymmetry, consideration of the full
range of cases refutes any suggestion that the deontic asymmetry constitutes
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a moral principle. The second part of the paper addresses the contention,
implicit in Roberts (2011), that commonsense partiality towards actual (over
merely possible) people supports the Asymmetry. I show that it does not.
1 Demandingness and the Deontic Asymmetry
We generally have some moral reason to make the world a better place, or
bring about better states of affairs. So, to refute the Asymmetry, it will
suffice to establish the following thesis:
Awesome Lives: It is (intrinsically) good or desirable that awesome
lives come to exist.
An ‘awesome’ life, as I use the term here, is one that exhibits a very high
quality of life, along whatever dimensions you take to be normatively rele-
vant. So it might, for example, be a life that is subjectively happy, contains
loving relationships, and exemplifies creative excellence and the achievement
of worthwhile goals. Whatever you like.
Awesome Lives is, I think, intuitively highly plausible. When we think
about what makes for a good state of affairs, the quality of life for the sentient
beings contained therein is surely a (if not the) primary factor. A world full
of awesome, flourishing lives is (intuitively) better than a world that lacks
these good lives. Not everyone will agree with this, of course, but it is
at least sufficiently plausible that anyone claiming to represent the broad
consensus of “commonsense morality” can hardly start from the assumption
that Awesome Lives is false.
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Given how plausible Awesome Lives seems in its own right, what moti-
vation is there to reject it? The main concern, I think, is the fear that it
will commit us to implausible procreative obligations.1 I certainly agree that
it is not, in general, obligatory to procreate. But it’s just bad reasoning to
conclude from this that there must be nothing good about bringing more
(good) lives into existence. After all, the following is not a generally valid
principle:
(No Duty =⇒ No Good): If we shouldn’t be required to do X,
then there is nothing good about X.
For example, it would be very odd for an opponent of stringent duties of
beneficence to conclude that, because we aren’t obligated to donate all we
can to help the global poor, it must be that helping the poor is not a good
thing—that their welfare simply doesn’t matter. Yet that is precisely the
reasoning of those who reject Awesome Lives simply on the basis of rejecting
procreative obligations. If we think that we are not obligated to do certain
things in order to benefit others, we should not conclude that those “others”
do not matter. A more promising strategy is to focus on the “certain things”
being requested of us, to see whether they might be too much to ask in a way
that would explain the lack of obligation. Commonsense morality rejects the
idea that we have to sacrifice everything to help the global poor, not because
the global poor don’t matter, but because our sacrificing everything does
matter, and would be too much for morality to demand of us.
1 I hear this a lot in conversation. For an example in print, see Piller (2014, 189): “saying
that more lives are better than fewer lives [. . . ] offends the deeply held asymmetry of our
attitudes to creation and destruction of human life: destruction is forbidden; creation is
not obligatory.”
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And so it goes, I suggest, for the commonsense rejection of positive procre-
ative duties. In our biological, psychological, and cultural context, to require
procreation would be massively intrusive and demanding. (Pregnancy alone
is arguably more demanding than, say, giving up a kidney would be. And
that’s before we even consider the life-changing implications of either raising
a child or giving up one’s progeny for adoption. Or, for that matter, the
idea that people have a moral prerogative, not easily overridden, over their
genetic material.)2 If extreme financial duties of beneficence are too demand-
ing to countenance, surely positive procreative duties are all the more so. So
there’s no motivation here to deny Awesome Lives. Implausible procreative
obligations are better denied on grounds of their excessive demandingness.3
It’s not that possible people don’t matter, but just that actual people (who
would have to bear and rear them) do.
It’s worth noting that there seems no such problem of demandingness for
the negative procreative duty to avoid bringing miserable lives into existence.
No minimally decent person could possibly wish to have a miserable child,
2 What of people who want to have children anyway? The first thing to note is that
so long as some would (reasonably) find it excessively burdensome, then we can deny
that there is any general requirement to procreate. But even for those who are happy
to procreate, I think it is most intuitive to still deny that they are thereby required to
do so. A putative requirement may be “too demanding”, in the relevant (broad) sense,
simply in virtue of inappropriately intruding upon an agent’s autonomy to decide a deeply
personal matter for themselves. Common sense holds that individuals are sovereign over
their own bodies and central life projects. These personal prerogatives cannot easily
give way to duties even if this violation of one’s autonomy and bodily integrity would
not be a “cost”, in the traditional sense, to one’s welfare. Compare, e.g., a putative
obligation to have sex. The obligation might be excessively burdensome, even if the sex
itself (if voluntarily undertaken) would not be. Likewise, I think, for the “burden”—
or unacceptable intrusiveness—of procreative obligations. Thanks to Christian Piller for
pressing me on this point.
3 Trevor Hedberg tells me that he is independently developing a similar line of argument
in a paper to be called ‘Unraveling the Asymmetry in Population Ethics’.
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after all, so insisting that they avoid this bad outcome is no great burden.4
Considerations of demandingness thus contribute to explaining the contin-
gent truth of the Procreative Deontic Asymmetry: that it’s impermis-
sible to (knowingly) bring a miserable life into existence, but permissible to
refrain from bringing awesome lives into existence. The reasons that permit
so refraining are specific to human biological procreation; they do not advert
to bringing people into existence in general (which would include bringing un-
related people fully-formed into a distant existence where they won’t impact
upon the agent’s life at all).
Since the asymmetry in demandingness that underpins the procreative
deontic asymmetry is contingent, so too is the deontic asymmetry itself. If
we imagine a scenario in which the act of “bringing into existence” is very
different in nature, such that a moral requirement here would not be intrusive
or demanding in any way, then we should (if I’m right) find that our intuitive
attachment to the deontic asymmetry likewise dissolves. So consider the
following case.
A Distant Realm: You learn that a new colony of awesome, happy,
flourishing people will pop into existence in some distant, otherwise-
inaccessible realm, unless you pluck and eat a particular apple.
4 At least, this is so in ordinary cases. It is interesting to imagine a case where refraining
from creating a miserable child somehow imposes a significant cost on the agent. It may
be that a level of burden sufficient to permit refraining from creating an awesome life is
not yet sufficient to permit creating a miserable one. Intuitively, the reasons (or prima
facie obligations) we have to refrain from creating miserable lives are more stringent than
those we have to create awesome ones; this is an instance of the Weak Asymmetry noted
earlier. But again, I’m happy to grant that. My claim here is just that we do in fact have
prima facie obligations both to prevent miserable lives and to create awesome ones, but
that in practice, only the latter prima facie obligation is demanding enough to be defeated.
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It strikes me as intuitively clear that you have good reason, in this case,
to refrain from plucking and eating the particular apple in question. This
suffices to refute the Asymmetry—we can have moral reason to bring good
lives into existence (or refrain from preventing their existence, which I take
to amount to much the same thing in this context).5 Moreover, it would
plausibly be positively wrong to eat the apple in this case. The personal
cost of refraining from eating a particular apple is so trivial, in comparison
to the great value of awesome lives, that it would seem perverse, or morally
indecent, to so act. So the Procreative Deontic Asymmetry does not hold of
necessity, as a matter of moral principle. It merely happens to be generally
true in our particular circumstances.
The key difference in real life, of course, is that procreation is not so trivial
a matter. But this just goes to show that it is these contingent complexi-
ties associated with child-bearing and rearing—rather than any fundamental
asymmetry in the moral status of bringing miserable vs awesome lives into
5 One reason to prefer formulating the case in terms of refraining from preventing ex-
istence is to minimize any confounding influence from the distinction between positive
and negative duties. Since refraining from bringing a miserable life into existence is most
naturally understood as a putative negative duty (do anything but this: procreate [given
that the kid would turn out miserable]), it would stack the deck unduly to contrast it with
a putative positive one (do precisely this: procreate [given that the kid would turn out
happy]). That is not the way to test for a fundamental normative asymmetry between
good and bad possible lives. We do better to consider a parallel putative negative duty
involving good possible lives, as the Distant Realm case does.
Also, it’s important that we’re talking about intrinsic moral reasons to promote the
existence of awesome lives, by which I mean reasos that stem just from the intrinsic nature
of the possible lives in question. Even proponents of the Asymmetry could recognize moral
reasons of an extrinsic sort to refrain from preventing procreation in certain circumstances.
E.g., we’ve moral reason to refrain from sterilizing people against their will. But this reason
stems from respect for the would-be parents’ autonomy, rather than stemming from the
value of the possible new lives. In the Distant Realm scenario, by contrast, I trust that the
intuitive reason to refrain from eating the apple does stem from the value of the possible
awesome lives whose existence is at stake.
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existence—that is doing the real work here. Once this is recognized, I (and,
I hope, the majority of readers) find no residual intuitive plausibility to the
Asymmetry. Its prima facie plausibility is exhaustively captured by weaker
related theses such as the contingent asymmetry in demandingness, and the
Weak Asymmetry mentioned in the introduction.
2 Partiality Towards the Actual
Roberts (2011, 772) writes: “[E]ven those theorists who do not find the Asym-
metry particularly intuitive surely will find within themselves the deeper
intuition that the existing Ann must in some way come before need-not-
ever-exist-at-all Ben.” Suppose Ann’s quality of life is currently near zero.
If you have the choice to either greatly help Ann, improving her quality of
life by some amount X for several decades, or else bring into existence a new
person ‘Ben’ with welfare X (and similar life expectancy of several decades),
it seems clear that you ought to help Ann. Call this the Deeper Intuition.
There are many possible explanations of this intuitive datum. Roberts
takes it to support a view she calls Variabilism, which in turn entails the
Asymmetry. I will argue that there are other, better explanations of the
Deeper Intuition that do not support the Asymmetry. Consider Roberts’
view:
Variabilism: “The loss of wellbeing incurred at a world where the per-
son who incurs that loss does or will exist has full moral significance for
purposes of evaluating an act performed at a given world that imposes
that loss and any alternate act performed at any alternate world that
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avoids that loss, while a loss incurred by that very same person at a
world where that person never exists at all has no moral significance
whatsoever.” (Roberts 2011, 773)
On this view, losses due to non-existence, or benefits due to existence,
simply don’t matter.
Variabilism secures some desired results. It explains the Deeper Intuition:
bringing Ben into existence has no inherent moral value, so we do better to
benefit the already-existing Ann instead. Bringing miserable people into
existence does matter morally though, as in this case the ‘loss’ is located in
a world where the agent exists, making it a morally bad outcome—just as it
should be.
Variabilism also has some undesirable features, however. It may seem
rather unprincipled or ad hoc—why don’t benefits due to existence get to
count? Also, by entailing the Asymmetry, it inherits the flaw of being unable
to accommodate our intuitions about the value of life in scenarios like A
Distant Realm. It isn’t plausible that the benefits of bringing into existence
should count for nothing at all. All that the Deeper Intuition supports is
that they count for less than benefiting those who exist antecedently.
So it is worth exploring alternative explanations of the Deeper Intuition.
One possibility is that average (and not just total) welfare matters, at least
to some degree. This would explain why it’s better, all else equal, to increase
total welfare without increasing the number of individuals who exist, and
hence to benefit Ann rather than bringing Ben into existence. But this is
not a sufficient explanation, because in a sufficiently large population the
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difference here could be negligible, whereas the importance of helping Ann
does not seem to diminish with greater population. (If anything, the opposite
seems true: bringing additional people into existence is better the fewer
people there already are—cf. Hurka (1983).)
A better explanation might appeal to the prioritarian idea that it’s espe-
cially important to benefit those who are “badly off” (or to prevent harms
that would leave one badly off), in the sense of having low or negative wel-
fare (Parfit 1997). The non-existent have no (or undefined) welfare value,
rather than low welfare, so there is no prioritarian reason to bring them
into existence. But there is prioritarian reason to help Ann, as she has low
welfare.
What if we imagine a variant of the case that involves a more privileged
existing individual Annabelle? Suppose Annabelle is antecedently very well-
off, so there is no (or negligible) prioritarian reason to favour her. Still, you
have the choice to make her even more well-off, or else to bring the new Ben
into existence. Which should you do? In this case, I think the answer is less
clear. This is some evidence that the prioritarian explanation of the original
Ann and Ben case is the correct one (or at least a significant contributing
factor, if not the whole story).
If you think we still ought to favour privileged-but-existing Annabelle over
“need-not-ever-exist-at-all” Ben, then I suspect your intuitions are instead
tracking a principle of Partiality Towards the Antecedently Actual.6 Accord-
6 This could be seen as an impartial expansion of Harman (2009)’s observation that
parents, for example, can reasonably be attached to the actual identity-shaping conditions
and histories of their children, even over higher-welfare alternative histories (e.g., hearing
for a deaf child).
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ing to this principle, we should give greater weight to the interests of those
who do or will actually exist independently of our current deliberations.7
Something along these lines seems the most natural way to try to ac-
commodate the Deeper Intuition. It’s the principle you get if you take the
Deeper Intuition at face value: Ann seems to matter more because she exists
independently; Ben, by contrast, need never exist at all, depending on what
choice we make.
The principle may need refinement, however. Suppose we are faced with a
choice between either preventing miserable Moe from coming into existence,
or else preventing some lesser harm to already-existing Ann. Since Ann
exists antecedently, Partiality Towards the Antecedently Actual would seem
to tell us to count her interests for more. Suppose we do, and as a result
let miserable Moe come to exist. Now Moe is actual, deserving of full moral
consideration, and so in retrospect it looks like our previous discounting of
his interests was regrettable. And predictably so.
Is that a problem? One might go either way on this. You could hold that
in cases where our attachments change over time, we might reasonably come
to later regret actions that were reasonable (indeed, right) at the time (Har-
man 2009). I may rightly favour a friend, only to later befriend the person I
previously slighted, and so come to regret the slight. Moreover, the intuitive
wrongness of letting miserable Moe come into existence might be adequately
7 It’s important to distinguish Partiality Towards the Antecedently Actual from the
full-blown Actualism—holding that only (timelessly) actual persons have any moral
signifiance—that Hare (2007) resoundingly refutes. It is closer to what Singer (2011, 88)
calls “the prior existence view”, only again less extreme insofar as it merely involves partial
rather than zero weighting for those whose existence is not guaranteed independently of
our current deliberations.
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explained on prioritarian grounds: If the lesser harm to Ann merely leaves her
less well-off, but still generally happy, then we’ve much stronger prioritarian
reasons to prevent Moe’s misery (by preventing his coming into existence).
This could suffice to outweigh any (plausibly moderate) partiality towards
already-existing Ann. If we suppose instead than Ann is antecedently badly
off, and the “lesser harm” would leave her in a position just as miserable
as Moe’s, then it’s less clear that we do wrong by preventing this harm to
Ann, and letting Moe come into existence. Some readers may thus be satis-
fied by the combination of prioritarianism and simple Partiality Towards the
Antecedently Actual.
If you nonetheless think it would be wrong to favour Ann and allow Moe
to come into a miserable existence, you could revise the partiality principle to
preclude discounting interests in non-existence. We should then give greater
weight to both the interests of those who do or will antecedently exist, and
the interests of possible people in remaining non-existent, discounting only
the interests of possible people in coming into existence.
Would this move be objectionably ad hoc? Perhaps not if you accept
a general principle proscribing predictably regrettable actions (call this the
Proscription of the Predictably Regrettable).8 After all, it’s one thing to say
8 Might there be cases where it is impossible to avoid acting regrettably? So long as we un-
derstand regret here in comparative terms—i.e., it’s regrettable that the agent performed
this action rather than some particular alternative option—then acting impartially should
avoid such regret. For example, while there’s obviously something unavoidably regrettable
about a situation in which you have to bring one of two possible (equally) miserable lives
into existence, neither choice would be comparatively regrettable, or worse, from an impar-
tial perspective. To conform to this principle in such a case then, it suffices to be impartial
in one’s concern for the two possible individuals (rather than, say, being partial towards
whoever ends up existing). Further, any residual concerns about the logical feasibility of
the principle can be addressed by appending “when possible” to the proscription.
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that reasonable partial acts might become regrettable in light of unforeseen
changes in one’s attachments. But what if the new attachment, and hence the
regret, is entirely predictable? Can I reasonably favour a friend over someone
who is not yet a friend but (I somehow know) will be in future? Can I
provide some benefit to my child, at what I know will be a greater cost to my
future (but not yet existent) second child? If not—if avoiding predictable
regret is indeed normatively mandatory—then we have principled grounds
for revising the Partiality principle as needed to ensure its conformity to this
prior normative principle.
The simplest way to ensure such conformity is precisely to disallow the
discounting of non-actual persons’ interests in non-existence. For if we do
discount them and allow the miserable life to come into existence, then the
person in question is no longer non-actual. The effect of discounting such
interests undermines the very grounds one had for the discounting in the first
place, and predictably so. The Proscription of the Predictably Regrettable
thus requires us to instead give full weight to the importance of preventing
miserable lives. We are forced to revise the principle of Partiality Towards the
Antecedently Actual to only admit of partiality within these independently
prescribed constraints : discounting possible people’s interests in existence,
but not their interests in non-existence. This then implies the plausible
Weak Asymmetry that we have less reason to bring good lives into existence
(since, in deliberation, their interests should be partly discounted on grounds
of lacking antecedent actuality) than to prevent bad lives (which must be
weighted in full, on pain of violating the Proscription of the Predictably
Regrettable).
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This revision adds an extra element of complexity to the Partiality view.
But it does not render it objectionably ad hoc in the way of Variabilism,
because the revision was forced on us by broader considerations of principle,
rather than just to accommodate our intuitions about particular cases.
Partiality views have other advantages over Variabilism. They avoid the
implausibly strong Asymmetry, being compatible with our intuition (from
cases like A Distant Realm) that we ought to forsake trivial benefits in order
to allow large increases in value from people coming into existence. (As with
any view involving partiality, it’s an interesting question just how much extra
weight we can properly give to those to whom we’re partial, but I will not
attempt to settle such details here.) And there are more subtle differences.
Consider that possible world w where Bob existed all along in place of
actual Ann (with the same quality of life, and all else equal). What should
our attitude be towards w, when comparing it with the actual world @? Ac-
cording to Variabilism, w and @ are normatively equivalent: each contains a
person that isn’t in the other, but who doesn’t exist in the world at which the
comparative personal ‘loss’ (of non-existence) takes place, so neither individ-
ual counts for purposes of this comparison. But I think it would be natural
for those who share the Deeper Intuition to feel rather more attached to ac-
tual Ann than that, and so to consider w to be lamentable for its lack of her.
(To help amplify the intuition, imagine that Ann is your actual child, and
Bob is another child you might have had in her place.) Partiality Towards
the Antecedently Actual accommodates this intuition.
Or, even more subtly, consider a couple of different world-pairs. Compare
improving Ann’s welfare in @ by a certain amount, to yield an improved
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world @+, as opposed to improving Bob’s welfare in w by that same amount,
to yield the improved world w+. If you think that you ought to more strongly
prefer @+ over @, as compared to the strength of your preference for w+
over w, then again this would seem an advantage of Partiality views over
Variabilism. (Since the benefited individual, be it Ann or Bob, still exists in
the alternative world where they aren’t so benefited, Variabilism gives full
and equal weight to both possible improvements.)
Variabilism might seem to do better in certain multiple-option cases.9
Suppose that you must choose between either (i) creating no-one, (ii) creating
Ann at +1 (low but positive) welfare and Ben at +9 (high) welfare, or (iii)
creating just Ann at +10 (high) welfare. Some might intuitively think that
option (ii) is wrong, despite bringing about the same amount of total welfare
as (iii) does, due to its being worse for Ann. Option (iii), by contrast, is
not worse for anyone who exists in that situation. Variabilism thus easily
secures the result that (ii) is a worse option than (iii). Partiality towards the
Antecedently Actual does not immediately secure this result, because the
availability of option (i), where neither exists, ensures that neither Ann nor
Ben qualify as antecedently actual here.
If one considers it important to proscribe option (ii), one need not resort
to full-blown Variabilism. One may merely appeal again to considerations
of regret and ratifiability. If you choose (ii), Ann’s existence gives you pro
tanto reasons to regret not having chosen (iii) instead. Option (iii) creates
no such grounds for regret. So if we accept a principle that directs us to
favour ratifiable over regrettable options, all else equal, then that will suffice
9 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting the following case.
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to rule out option (ii), as desired. There’s certainly no basis here for further
claiming that the benefits of existence morally count for nothing.
We’ve seen that in order to explain the Deeper Intuition without entailing
the Asymmetry, one can accept simple Partiality Towards the Antecedently
Actual, the revised version constrained by the Proscription of the Predictably
Regrettable, or just stick to plain old Prioritarianism. Either of these three
options strikes me as superior to Variabilism, and their disjunction even
more so. We thus find that the Deeper Intuition provides no support for the
Asymmetry. The former is best explained without the latter.
Conclusion
The Asymmetry has previously been considered part of commonsense moral-
ity. One may dispute it on theoretical grounds, it’s been thought, but only
at the cost of abandoning widely-shared moral intuitions. I’ve argued that
this is not so. Further reflection reveals that the Asymmetry is not in fact
supported by our intuitions about cases. Related theses—the Weak Asym-
metry, and a contingent asymmetry in demandingness—exhaustively capture
all that was prima facie plausible about the Asymmetry. When we consider
A Distant Realm, in which the asymmetry in demandingness no longer holds,
there is no longer any plausibility to the idea that there’s no moral reason
to bring awesome lives into existence. Moreover, we’ve seen that indirect
attempts to establish the Asymmetry via the even more compelling Deeper
Intuition also fail. I conclude that we’ve no reason at all to accept the Asym-
metry, and every reason to reject it.
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